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Abstract: 
 
This paper develops a DSGE model for an open economy and estimates it on euro 
area data using Bayesian estimation techniques. The model features nominal and real 
frictions, as well as financial frictions in the form of liquidity constrained households. 
The model incorporates active monetary and fiscal policy rules (for government 
consumption, investment, transfers and wage taxes) and can be used to analyse the 
effectiveness of stabilisation policies. To capture the unit root character of 
macroeconomic time-series we allow for stochastic trend in TFP, but instead of 
filtering data prior to estimation, we estimate the model in growth rates and stationary 
nominal ratios.  
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Introduction  
 
In this paper we develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model 
for an open economy. We estimate this model on quarterly data for the euro area 
using Bayesian estimation techniques. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(2001) considerable progress has been made in recent years in the estimation of New-
Keynesian DSGE models which feature nominal and real frictions. In these models, 
behavioural equations are explicitly derived from intertemporal optimisation of 
private sector agents under technological, budget and institutional constraints such as 
imperfections in factor, goods and financial markets. In this framework, 
macroeconomic fluctuations can be seen as the optimal response of the private sector 
to demand and supply shocks in various markets, given the constraints mentioned 
above. DSGE models are therefore well suited to analyse the extent to which fiscal 
and monetary policies can alleviate existing distortions by appropriately responding to 
macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Following Smets and Wouters (2003) DSGE models have been used extensively to 
study the effects of monetary policy and the stabilising role of monetary rules. In 
particular it has been demonstrated that an active role for monetary policy arises from 
the presence of nominal rigidities in goods and factor markets. So far, not much work 
has been devoted towards exploring the role of fiscal policy in the New Keynesian 
model. Our paper therefore extends this literature by incorporating and estimating 
reaction functions for government consumption, investment and transfers into a 
DSGE model. 
 
There is substantial empirical evidence that prices and wages adjust sluggishly to 
supply and demand shocks as documented in numerous studies of wage and price 
behaviour, starting from early Phillips curve estimates (see, for example, Phelps, 
1967) and extending to recent estimates using both backward as well as forward 
looking price and wage rules (see e.g. Gali et al., 2001). The recent work by Gali et al. 
(2007), Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2006) has also highlighted the 
presence of liquidity constraints as an additional market imperfection. The 
introduction of non-Ricardian behaviour in the model could give rise to a role for 
fiscal stabilisation, since liquidity constrained households do not respond to interest 
rate signals. 
 
Obviously, a prerequisite for such an analysis is a proper empirical representation of 
the data generating process. The seminal work of Smets and Wouters (2003) has 
shown that DSGE models can in fact provide a satisfactory representation of the main 
macroeconomic aggregates in the Euro area. Also, various papers by Adolfson et al. 
(2007) have documented a satisfactory forecasting performance when compared to 
standard VAR benchmarks. This paper extends the basic DSGE model in four 
directions. First, it respects the unit root character of macroeconomic time series by 
allowing for stochastic trends in TFP. Unlike many other estimated DGSE models, we 
do not detrend our data with linear time trends or the Hodrick-Prescott filter, but we 
estimate the model in growth rates and nominal ratios. Secondly, it treats the euro area 
as an open economy, which introduces additional shocks to the economy through 
trade and the exchange rate. Thirdly, it adds financial market imperfections in the 
form of liquidity constrained households to imperfections in the form of nominal 
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rigidities in goods and labour markets. Fourthly, it introduces a government sector 
with stabilising demand policies. We empirically identify government spending rules 
by specifying current government consumption, investment and transfers as functions 
of their own lags as well as current and lagged output and unemployment gaps and we 
allow a fraction of transfers to respond to deviations of government debt from its 
target. From the operation of the euro area unemployment insurance system we know 
that unemployment benefits provide quasi-automatic income stabilisation. Indeed we 
find a significant response of transfers to cyclical variations in employment. A priori 
government consumption is not explicitly countercyclical, though it can already 
provide stabilisation by keeping expenditure fixed in nominal terms over the business 
cycle. The empirical evidence suggests that fiscal policy is used in a countercyclical 
fashion in the euro area.  
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In section one we describe the model and 
characterise the shocks hitting the euro area economy. Section two presents the 
empirical fit of our DSGE model and we present priors and posterior estimates as well 
as the variance decomposition of the model. In section three we analyses the impulse 
response functions of the main macro economic variables to structural shocks. 
Finally, in section 4 we use our model in a counterfactual analysis to identify two 
alternative explanations of the declining wage share in the euro area. 
 
1. The Model 
 
We consider an open economy which faces an exogenous world interest rate, world 
prices and world demand. The domestic and foreign firms produce a continuum of 
differentiated goods. The goods produced in the home country are imperfect 
substitutes for goods produced abroad. The model economy is populated by 
households and firms and there is a monetary and fiscal authority, both following 
rule-based stabilisation policies. We distinguish between households which are 
liquidity constrained and consume their disposable income and households who have 
full access to financial markets. The latter make decisions on financial and real capital 
investments. Behavioural and technological relationships can be subject to 
autocorrelated shocks denoted by , where k stands for the type of shock. The 
logarithm of 1
k
tU
k
tU  will generally follow an AR(1) process with autocorrelation 
coefficient  and innovation .  kρ ktε
 
1.1 Firms: 
 
1.1.1 Final output producers 
 
There are n monopolistically competitive final goods producers. Each firm indexed by 
j produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute for varieties 
produced by other firms. Domestic firms sell to private domestic households, to 
investment goods producing firms, the government and to exporting firms. All 
demand sectors have identical nested CES preferences across domestic varieties and 
                                                 
1 Lower cases denote logarithms, i.e. zt = log(Zt ). Lower cases are also used for ratios and rates. 
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between domestic and foreign goods, with elasticity of substitution  and 
respectively. The demand function for firm j is  given by 
dσ
Mσ
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where  is total consumption of private households,  and denote government 
consumption and investment,  is the input of investment goods producing firms 
and  represents exports. The variables ,  and  represent the price index of 
final output, the price of an individual firm and the import price index. We make the 
assumption that individual firms are small enough such as to take  and  as 
given. Output is produced with a Cobb Douglas production function using capital  
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The term  represents overhead labour. Total employment of the firm  is itself a 
CES aggregate of labour supplied by individual households i. The parameter 
j
tLO
j
tL
1>θ  
determines the degree of substitutability among different types of labour. Firms also 
decide about the degree of capacity utilisation ( ). There is an economy wide 
technology shock  which follows a random walk with drift 
j
tucap
Y
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The share of overhead labour in total employment ( ) follows an AR(1) process 
around its long run value 
j
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The objective of the firm is to maximise the present discounted value of profits  jtPr
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where iK denotes the rental rate of capital. Firms also face technological and 
regulatory constraints which restrict their price setting, employment and capacity 
utilisation decisions. Price setting rigidities can be the result of the internal 
organisation of the firm or specific customer-firm relationships associated with certain 
market structures. 
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Costs of adjusting labour have a strong job specific component (e.g. training costs) 
but higher employment adjustment costs may also arise in heavily regulated labour 
markets with search frictions. Costs associated with the utilisation of capital can result 
from higher maintenance costs associated with a more intensive use of capital. 
Adjustment costs are given by the following convex functional forms 
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The firm determines labour input, capital services and prices optimally in each period 
given the technological and administrative constraints as well as demand conditions. 
The first order conditions are given by: 
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where ηt is the Lagrange multiplier of the technological constraint and the real interest 
rate rt is used for discounting. Firms equate the marginal product of labour, net of 
marginal adjustment costs, to wage costs. As can be seen from the left hand side of 
equation (7a), the convex part of the adjustment cost function penalises in cost terms 
accelerations and decelerations of changes in employment. Equations (7b-c) jointly 
determine the optimal capital stock and capacity utilisation by equating the marginal 
value product of capital to the rental price and the marginal product of capital services 
to the marginal cost of increasing capacity. Equation (7d) defines the mark up factor 
as a function of the elasticity of substitution and changes in inflation. The average 
mark up is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. We follow the 
empirical literature and allow for additional backward looking elements by assuming 
that a fraction (1-sfp) of firms index price increases to inflation in t-1. 
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Finally we also allow for a mark up shock. This leads to the following specification of 
the aggregate price mark-up 
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1.2.2 Investment goods producers 
 
There is a perfectly competitive investment goods production sector which combines 
domestic and foreign final goods, using the same CES aggregators as households and 
governments do to produce investment goods for the domestic economy. Denote the 
CES aggregate of domestic and foreign inputs used by the investment goods sector 
with , then real output of the investment goods sector is produced by the following 
linear production function,  
inp
tI
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where  is a technology shock to the investment good production technology which 
itself follows a random walk with drift 
I
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Given our assumption concerning the input used in the investment goods production 
sector, investment goods prices are given by 
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1.2 Households: 
 
The household sector consists of a continuum of households . A share 
 of these households are not liquidity-constrained and indexed by 
. They have full access to financial markets, they buy and sell domestic 
and foreign assets (government bonds and equity). The remaining households are 
liquidity-constrained and indexed by 
[ 1,0∈h ]
)1( slc−
[ )slci −∈ 1,0
[ ]1,1 slck −∈ . These households do not trade on 
asset markets and consume their disposable income each period. Both types of 
households supply differentiated labour services to unions which maximise a joint 
utility function for each type of labour i. It is assumed that types of labour are 
distributed equally over the two household. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is 
introduced by assuming that the household faces adjustment costs for changing 
wages. These adjustment costs are borne by the household.  
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1.2.1 Non Liquidity constrained households 
 
Households decide about four types of assets, domestic and foreign nominal bonds 
( ), the stock of physical capital ( ) and cash balances ( ).The household 
receives income from labour, nominal bonds and rental income from lending capital 
to firms plus profit income from firms owned by the household. Income from labour 
is taxed at rate t
Fi
t
i
t BB ,
i
tK
i
tM
w, rental income at rate ti. In addition households pay lump-sum taxes 
TLS. We assume that income from financial wealth is subject to different types of risk. 
Domestic bonds yield risk-free nominal return equal to it. Foreign bonds are subject to 
an external financial intermediation premium risk(.), which is a positive function of 
the economy wide level of foreign indebtedness. An equity premium  on real 
assets arises because of uncertainty about the return of real assets. The Lagrangian of 
this maximisation problem is given by   
K
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The utility function is non-separable in consumption ( ) and leisure ( ) of the 
King, Plosser, Rebelo (1988) type. We also allow for habit persistence in 
consumption and leisure. Thus temporal utility for consumption is given by  
i
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The investment decisions w. r. t. real capital are subject to convex adjustment costs, 
therefore we make a distinction between real investment expenditure (I) and physical 
investment (J). Investment expenditure of households including adjustment costs is 
given by 
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The budget constraint is written in real terms with all prices expressed relative to the 
GDP deflator (P). Investment is a composite of domestic and foreign goods. The first 
order conditions of the household with respect to consumption and financial wealth 
are given by the following equations2: 
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All arbitrage conditions are standard, except for a trading friction on foreign bonds, 
which is modelled as a function of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. Using the 
arbitrage conditions, investment is given as a function of  the variable  tQ
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where  is the present discounted value of the rental rate of return from investing in 
real assets 
tQ
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where the relevant discount factor for the investor is the nominal interest rate minus 
expected inflation of investment goods. Also, because  and  are negatively 
correlated there is a positive equity premium. 
tQ
I
tπ
 
 
                                                 
2 With an interest rate rule as specified below, an optimality condition for money would only determine 
the desired money holdings of the household sector without any further consequence for the rest of the 
economy. For that reason any further discussion on money demand is dropped here. 
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1.2.2 Liquidity constrained households 
 
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their entire 
labour income at each date. Real consumption of household k is thus determined by 
net wage income plus transfers minus a lump-sum tax 
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It is assumed that liquidity constrained households possess the same utility function as 
Ricardian households. 
 
 
1.2.3  Wage setting 
 
A trade union is maximising a joint utility function for each type of labour i where it 
is assumed that types of labour are distributed equally over constrained and 
unconstrained households with weights slc and (1-slc) respectively. The trade union 
sets wages by maximising a weighted average of the utility functions of Ricardian and 
liquidity constrained households. The wage rule is obtained by equating a weighted 
average of the marginal utility of leisure to a weighted average of the marginal utility 
of consumption times the real wage of these two household types, adjusted for a wage 
mark up. In addition we also allow for additional wage rigidity via sluggish 
adjustment of the real consumption wage   
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where  is the wage mark up factor, with wage mark ups fluctuating around Wtη θ/1  
which is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of 
labour services. The trade union sets the consumption wage as a mark up over the 
reservation wage. The reservation wage is the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to 
the marginal utility of consumption. This is a natural measure of the reservation wage. 
If this ratio is equal to the consumption wage, the household is indifferent between 
supplying an additional unit of labour and spending the additional income on 
consumption and not increasing labour supply. Fluctuation in the wage mark up arises 
because of wage adjustment costs and the fact that a fraction (1-sfw) of workers is 
indexing the growth rate of wages  to inflation in the previous period.   Wtπ
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with .Combining (17) and (18) one can show that the (semi) elasticity of 
wage inflation with respect to the employment rate is given by 
10 ≤≤ sfw
( )Wγκ / , i. e. it is 
positively related to the inverse of the labour supply elasticity and inversely related to 
wage adjustment costs. 
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1.2.4 Aggregation 
 
The aggregate of any household specific variable  in per capita terms is given by 
since households within each group are identical. 
Hence aggregate consumption is given by 
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Since liquidity constrained households do not own financial assets we have 
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1.3 Trade and the current account  
 
So far we have only determined aggregate consumption, investment and government 
purchases but not the allocation of expenditure over domestic and foreign goods. In 
order to facilitate aggregation we assume that households, the government and the 
corporate sector have identical preferences across goods used for private 
consumption, public expenditure and investment. Let { }iGiGiii ICICZ ,, ,,,∈  be the 
demand of an individual household, investor or the government, then their preferences 
are given by the following utility function 
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where the share parameter sM can be subject to random shocks and idZ  and ifZ  are 
indexes of demand across the continuum of differentiated goods produced 
respectively in the domestic economy and abroad, given by. 
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The elasticity of substitution between bundles of domestic and foreign goods idZ  and 
ifZ  is . Thus aggregate imports are given by Mσ
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where  and  is the (utility based) consumer price deflator and the lag structure 
captures delivery lags. We assume similar demand behaviour in the rest of the world, 
therefore exports can be treated symmetrically and are given by  
CP MP
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where ,  and  are the export deflator, an index of world consumer prices 
(in foreign currency) and world demand. Prices for exports and imports are set by 
domestic and foreign exporters respectively. The exporters in both regions buy goods 
from their respective domestic producers and sell them in foreign markets. They 
transform domestic goods into exportables using a linear technology. Exporters act as 
monopolistic competitors in export markets and charge a mark-up over domestic 
prices. Thus export prices are given by 
X
tP
FC
tP
, F
tY
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and import prices are given by 
 
(24)    Ftt
M
t
M
t PEP =η
 
Mark-up fluctuations arise because of price adjustment costs. There is also some 
backward indexation of prices since a fraction of exporters (1-sfpx) and (1-sfpm) is 
indexing changes of prices to past inflation. The mark ups for import and export 
prices is also subject to random shocks 
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Exports and imports together with interest receipts/payments determine the evolution 
of net foreign assets denominated in domestic currency.  
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1.4 Policy 
 
We assume that fiscal and monetary policy is partly rules based and partly 
discretionary. Policy responds to an output gap indicator of the business cycle. The 
output gap is not calculated as the difference between actual and efficient output but 
we try to use a measure that closely approximates the standard practice of output gap 
calculation as used for fiscal surveillance and monetary policy (see Denis et al. 
(2006)). Often a production function framework is used where the output gap is 
defined as deviation of capital and labour utilisation from their long run trends. 
Therefore we define the output gap as 
 
 (27) 
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where  and  are moving average steady state employment rate and capacity 
utilisation: 
ss
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which we restrict to move slowly in response to actual values. 
 
1.4.1   Fiscal Policy 
 
Both expenditure and receipts are responding to business cycle conditions. On the 
expenditure side we identify the systematic response of government consumption, 
government transfers and government investment to the business cycle.  For 
government consumption and government investment we specify the following rules 
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Government consumption and government investment can temporarily deviate from 
their long run targets cgy and igy (expressed as ratios to GDP in nominal terms) in 
response to fluctuations of the output gap. Due to information and implementation 
lags the response may occur with some delay. This feature is captured by a distributed 
lag of the output gap in the reaction function.  
 
The transfer system provides income for unemployed and for pensioners and acts as 
an automatic stabiliser. The generosity of the social benefit system is characterised by 
three parameters: the fraction of the non-employed which receive unemployment 
benefits and the level of payments for unemployed and pensioners. In other words the 
number of non-participants  is treated as a government decision variable. NPARTPOP
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We assume that unemployment benefits and pensions are indexed to wages with 
replacement rates  and  respectively and we formulate the following linear 
transfer rule 
Ub Rb
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Government revenues are financed by taxes on consumption as well as capital and 
labour income.  
G
tR
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Following the OECD estimates for revenue elasticities (van den Noord (2000)) we 
assume that consumption and capital income tax follow a linear scheme, and a 
progressive labour income tax schedule 
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where measures the average tax rate, and the degree of progressivity. A simple 
first-order Taylor expansion around a zero output gap yields 
w
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Government debt ( ) evolves according to tB
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There is a lump-sum tax ( ) used for controlling the debt to GDP ratio according to 
the following rule 
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where  is the government debt target.  Tb
 
 
1.4.2   Central bank policy rule (interest rate rule) 
 
Monetary policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some 
smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation and output gap 
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The central bank has a constant inflation target  and it adjusts interest rates 
whenever actual consumer price inflation deviates from the target and it also responds 
to the output gap. There is also some inertia in nominal interest rate setting. 
Tπ
 
2. Estimation  
 
Our technological assumptions imply that domestic and foreign GDP and its 
components are stationary in growth rates. Our model implies that various nominal 
ratios such as the consumption to GDP ratio (cyn), the investment to GDP ratio (iyn), 
the government consumption to GDP ratio (cgyn), the government investment to GDP 
ratio (igyn), the government transfers to wages ratio (trw), the trade balance3 share in 
GDP (tbyn), the wage share (ws), the employment rate (L) and the real exchange rate 
(RER) are stationary. Concerning nominal variables we assume that the domestic and 
foreign inflation target is a constant. This implies that domestic wage inflation rate 
( ), domestic and foreign price inflation (wπ π , ) rates and nominal domestic and 
foreign interest rates ( i , ) are stationary,  as well as certain price ratios, in particular 
the relative import (P
Fπ
Fi
P
M/P) and export price (PXP
                                                
/P)  ratios.  These variables, together 
with the exogenous technology shock to the investment good production ( ) form 
our information set. World economy series [ , , Δy
IU
Fi Fπ F] are considered as 
exogenous and are modeled as a VAR(1) process. To assure stationarity of the Y/YW 
ratio, an equilibrium correction term is added to the ΔyF equation. This introduces a 
small feedback of domestic demand into world demand. The model is estimated on 
quarterly data for the euro area over the period 1981Q1 to 2006Q1, taken from the 
ECB AWM data base and updated with Eurostat quarterly national accounts database.  
Some data transformations are taken: 
1. all real quantities are divided by the (linear) trend of active population, to 
obtain per-capita data; 
2. relative linear trends in price indexes and real quantities have been removed, 
except for  the trend in wage share, which is not removed from the data; 
3. the trend in the series of employment is also removed; 
4. the pension component of the transfer rule is removed from the data prior to 
estimation: this eliminates the trend in the transfer to wage share and only the 
reaction coefficient  is estimated. Ub
 
All the exogenous observed processes (world economy, technology shock to 
investment good production) have been estimated separately to the rest of the model 
parameters. 
The parameters listed in Table 1 are calibrated and kept constant over the estimation 
exercise. The reaction of wage taxes to output gap is set to 0.8, following OECD 
estimates. 
Wt1
 
 
 
3 Concerning the import and export share we remove a trade integration trend prior to estimation. As 
import and export data for the euro area include intra euro-area trade we also assumed the foreign 
demand and price terms in the export (22) and import price equation (24) were a weighted average of 
foreign and domestic terms, with a share of 0.5 of intra euro area trade in total trade. 
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TABLE 1. Calibrated parameters 
 
Structural parameters Steady states  
α  0.52 cgy  0.203 
Gα  0.9 igy  0.025 
β  0.996 UIg  0 
δ  0.025 π ,  Fπ 0.005 
Gδ  0.0125 popWg  0.00113 
τB 4.e-6 Yg , YFg  0.003 
τDEF 4.e-3 UPg   0.0024 
bT 2.4 ucap  1 
dσ  10 L  0.65 
INOMρ   0 XWX ωω =   
EXρ ,  IMρ 0.975 θ  1.6 
LOLρ  0.99 TRWS 0.36 
Kt , ,  ct w0τ 0.2   
w
1τ  0.8   
 
 
Other parameters are determined according to steady state constraints: 
• )1/KSN-(1*)-(1 1, ατγ =ucap , determined in order to assure the steady state 
constraint ucap = 1, where PPIYKKSN /*/=  is the nominal capital to GDP 
share. 
• ω  is determined in order to assure the steady state condition 65.0=L  
 
The dynamical forms of government spending and government investment have been 
identified by estimating separately from the rest of the model an array of models of 
the general form: 
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where  is the growth rate of the government spending or government investment, 
L is the lagged operator and  are the inputs. The selection of the model is then 
taken considering both the 
tgΔ
tiu ,
2TR  statistics, based on the response error, and 
information criteria.  
 
For both government consumption and investment, the input is the output gap plus an 
error correction to assure stationarity of the nominal shares to GDP. This implied a 
two step-procedure, where first the dynamical structure was identified using a HP-
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filtered output gap. The obtained structure and coefficients are fed into the DSGE 
model, which is estimated given the previously identified coefficients. At this stage, 
we obtain a model based output gap which is again fed into the separated 
identification procedure to check the validity of the structure identified with HP-
filtered output gap. The coefficients in the government spending rules are then 
estimated together with the other parameters in the DSGE model. Thus, the estimated 
government consumption rule takes the form   
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The model parameters are estimated applying the Bayesian approach as, e.g., 
Schorfheide (2000), Smets and Wouters (2003). From the computational point of 
view, the DYNARE toolbox for MATLAB has been applied (Juillard, 1996-2005).  
 
2.1 Prior distributions 
 
Exogenous AR shocks have beta distributions for auto-correlation coefficients with 
prior mean at 0.85 except for the monetary shock, where we set prior mean to 0.5 (i.e. 
we did not have any ‘preference’ between a persistent shock or a white noise) and for 
the overhead labour shock, where we set prior mean to 0.95. Standard errors have 
prior gamma distributions, with prior mean values at  
• 0.5% for ‘persistent shocks’ (accounting for different trends in the data, like 
overhead labour,) and for shocks to risk premia; 
• 0.25% for monetary  shock; 
• 5% for technology shock, preference and adjustment costs shocks, nominal 
GDP shares of government consumption, investment, transfers; 
• 10% for mark-up shocks  
 
For the fiscal parameters, we set a prior around zero for τCG and τIG, to let the data 
drive pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical reaction of government consumption and 
investment to changes in the output gap. For transfers we also set a neutral prior mean 
of bU at 0.  Persistence in the government spending rule has a prior at 0.5, while for 
investment and transfers this is set to 0.85. 
 
For price and wage rigidities we roughly follow Smets and Wouters (2003), but 
allowing a wider variation in the upper bound (prior mean at 30). Capital and labour 
adjustment costs have similar priors, while for investment the prior is smaller (15). 
Prior consumption and leisure habits are set at 0.7. Inverse of intertemporal elasticities 
have prior gamma distributions with mean 1.25 and standard deviation 0.5 (2 and 1 
for ). The share of liquidity constrained households has a neutral prior at 0.5, with 
standard deviation 0.1, similar to Forni et al. (2006). Finally, the share of forward 
looking behaviour in hybrid Phillips curves and the price indexation coefficients in 
import and export equations have prior mean at 0.5 in the range [0, 1]. 
Cσ
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2.2 Posterior estimation 
 
The draws from the posterior distribution have been obtained by taking two parallel 
chains of 300,000 runs of Metropolis. Convergence of the Markov Chain has been 
tested by cumulated means and by the diagnostics by Brooks and Gelman (1998). The 
shape of the likelihood at the posterior mode and the Hessian condition number have 
been also considered to highlight lack of identification for some parameters4. In Table 
2.1 we show prior distributions and posterior estimations of our structural parameters 
(see Table A1 in the annex for estimates of standard errors of shocks and AR 
coefficients of autocorrelated shocks and Figure A1 for the plots of priors and 
posterior distributions).  
 
The estimated fraction of forward looking price setting behaviour is high. The 
posterior mean for sfp is estimated at 0.87, which implies only 13 percent of firms 
keep prices fixed at the t-1 level. The estimated share of liquidity-constrained 
consumers is 0.35, which is similar to estimates reported in Coenen and Straub (2005) 
and lower than in Forni et al. (2006). Note that our estimates also suggest a degree of 
habit persistence in consumption of 0.56 and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
of around 0.25.   
 
                                                 
4 Only for two structural parameters does the likelihood not dominate the prior, namely for export price 
rigidity ( PXγ ) and risk. See also Canova and Sala (2005) about identification problems in the Smets 
and Wouters model and in DSGE models in general. 
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TABLE 2.1: Estimation Results for structural parameters. 
Prior Posterior  
Parameter name distrib mean std mean std 
Cσ   gamma 2 1 4.0962 0.813
slc  beta 0.5 0.1 0.3507 0.0754
hC  Beta 0.7 0.1 0.5634 0.0412
hL  Beta 0.7 0.1 0.8089 0.0778κ   gamma 1.25 0.5 1.9224 0.4438
 risk  beta 0.02 0.008 0.02 0.0074
 rp  beta 0.02 0.008 0.0245 0.0026
 γucap,2  beta 0.05 0.024 0.0453 0.0128
Xω   beta 0.8 0.08 0.8588 0.0196
Xσ   gamma 1.25 0.5 2.5358 0.32
Mσ   gamma 1.25 0.5 1.1724 0.2136
INOM
Lagτ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.9009 0.0155
INOM
πτ   beta 2 0.4 1.959 0.2066
IINOM
Y 1,τ   beta 0.3 0.2 0.4274 0.1141
INOM
Y 2,τ   beta 0.3 0.2 0.0783 0.0277
CG
Lagτ   Beta 0 0.4 -0.4227 0.1041
CG
Adjτ   Beta -0.5 0.2 -0.1567 0.0442
CG
0τ   beta 0 0.6 -0.0754 0.1066
IG
Lagτ   Beta 0.5 0.2 0.4475 0.0895
IG
Adjτ   beta -0.5 0.2 -0.1222 0.0461
IG
0τ   Beta 0 0.6 0.1497 0.0996
 bU  beta 0 0.6 0.597 0.0627
Kγ   gamma 30 20 76.0366 20.5526
Iγ   gamma 15 10 1.1216 0.5185
Lγ   gamma 30 20 58.2083 12.2636
Pγ   gamma 30 20 61.4415 10.4208
PMγ   gamma 30 20 1.6782 0.9092
PXγ   gamma 30 20 26.1294 16.8398
Wγ   gamma 30 20 1.2919 0.8261
WRγ   beta 0.5 0.2 0.2653 0.1315
Sfp 
 beta 0.5 0.2 0.8714 0.0567
Sfpm  beta 0.5 0.2 0.7361 0.1227
Sfpx  beta 0.5 0.2 0.918 0.0473
Sfw  beta 0.5 0.2 0.7736 0.1565
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The estimated fiscal response parameters are counter-cyclical for government 
transfers. We find a positive response of transfers to the employment gap bU (=0.6). 
Government consumption responds negatively to the current change in the output gap.  
The investment rule appears procyclical, with a high degree of persistence. The only 
parameter relevant for stabilisation policy on the revenues side is the degree of 
progressivity of wage taxes. Due to a lack of reliable data on tax rates we do not 
estimate this parameter but set it corresponding to the OECD estimate of the elasticity 
of tax revenues with respect to the output gap5.  
 
By way of comparison, other studies that have analysed the actual behaviour of fiscal 
authorities have mainly focused on the overall deficit rather than on government 
expenditure catagories seperately. Gali and Perotti (2003) assess the extent to which 
the constraints associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
pact have made fiscal policy in EMU countries more procyclical. They find 
discretionary fiscal policy (as measured by the primary cyclically adjusted deficit of 
general government) was procyclical in EMU countries before Maastricht and 
essentially acyclical after Maastricht. They also find an increase in the degree in 
counter-cyclicality of non-discretionary fiscal policy (as measured by the difference 
between the total primary deficit and the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit) in EMU 
countries. In contrast, von Hagen and Wyplosz (2007), using data until 2006, find that 
the primary cyclically adjusted deficit has become countercyclical after 1992 and was 
acyclical before. European Commission (2004, Ch.3)  also find evidence of a change 
in the response of the total primary budget balance to the output gap, with an 
insignificant impact of the cycle on primary balances before 1994 and a significant 
positive impact of the output gap on the primary balance post 1994. Concerning 
transfers, our results are consistent with those of Darby and Melitz (2007), who find 
that age- and health-related social expenditure as well as incapacity benefits all react 
to the cycle in a stabilising manner. 
 
In Figure 1 we show the one step ahead predictions of the model for the growth rates 
of GDP ( ), consumption ( ), investment ( ), labour ( ), government 
consumption ( ), government investment ( ), government transfers ( ), as 
well as for inflations (
Yg Cg Ig Lg
Gg GIg TRg
π , , ), wage inflation ( ), growth rate of investment 
specific technological progress ( ), nominal interest rates ( , ), nominal 
exchange rate ( ), world inflation ( ), world GDP ( ).  
Mπ Xπ Wπ
UIg i Fi
Eg Fπ YWg
We also show the fit of nominal ratios to GDP of consumption (cyn), government 
consumption (cgyn), government investment (igyn), investment (iyn), trade balance 
(tbyn), transfers to wages ratio (trw), the real foreign GDP to domestic GDP ratio 
(ywy) as well as the stationary real exchange rate (ER), labour (L), wage share (ws), 
import to GDP deflator (PM/P), export to GDP  deflator (PX/P). 
 
 
                                                 
5 The OECD calculates an elasticity of income tax revenue with respect to the output gap of 1.5 and an 
elasticity of the wage bill w.r.t. the gap of 0.7. This implies an elasticity of the tax rate w.r.t. to output 
gap of 0.8. 
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FIGURE 1. In-sample one step ahead predictions of the estimated model. (Data are 
grey lines; model predictions are black lines) 
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2.3 Model comparisons  
 
A quite widely applied method to assess the validity of the estimated DSGE models is 
to compare them with non-structural linear reduced-form models such as VARs or 
BVARs (see e.g. Sims, 2003; Schorfheide, 2004; Smets and Woutyers, 2003; Juillard 
et al. 2006). In Table 2.2 we compare our base model with BVAR models (lags 1 to 
12) using Sims and Zha (1998) priors. The BVAR estimates were obtained following 
Juillard et al. (2006), combining the Minnesota prior with dummy observations. The 
prior decay and tightness parameters are set to 0.5 and 3, respectively. As in Juillard 
et al. (2006), the parameter determining the weight on own-persistence (sum-of-
coefficients on own lags) is set at 2 and the parameter determining the degree of co-
persistence is set at 5. To obtain priors for error terms we used the residuals from 
unconstrained AR(1) processes estimated over a sample of observations that was 
extended back to 1978Q1 (the DSGE model is estimated over a sample starting from 
1981Q1). The marginal data density of the DSGE has been obtained from the two-
chain, 300,000 replications of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm using the modified 
harmonic mean formula suggested by Geweke. Similarly to other estimated DSGE’s 
in the literature, our base model has a better marginal likelihood than BVAR’s. 
Although the robustness of these kinds of results is sometimes criticized, for the 
reason that it may depend on different prior assumptions in both the DSGE and the 
BVAR, BVARs are a potentially useful metric for comparing the out-of-sample 
performance of DSGE models. 
 
 
TABLE 2.2. Comparison of the fit of the base model and of BVAR’s. 
 
 
 Marginal likelihood 
BVAR(1) 6752.695 
BVAR(2) 6835.592 
BVAR(3) 6831.757 
BVAR(4) 6835.782 
BVAR(5) 6836.935 
BVAR(6) 6828.311 
BVAR(7) 6837.512 
BVAR(8) 6835.597 
BVAR(9) 6835.392 
BVAR(10) 6827.01 
BVAR(11) 6825.155 
BVAR(12) 6829.694 
DSGE model 7066.91 
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In Table 2.3 we also report the RSME’s of the 1-step and 4-step ahead predictions of 
the DSGE model and of a VAR(1) that includes error corrections mimicking the long 
run restrictions implied by the model concerning nominal ratios. In Figure 1 bis we 
also show the plots of the 1-step ahead fit of the VAR(1). The in-sample RMSE’s of 
the VAR(1) are obviously better than those of the DSGE, and they are useful to have 
an idea of the ‘upper’ bound of the in-sample fit. This does not obviously imply a 
better performance of the VAR out-of-sample (see above discussion on BVAR 
comparison). It is interesting to note that for most of the observed variables, the 
DSGE performs better in the 4-step than in the 1-step ahead prediction horizons.  
 
TABLE 2.3. Comparison of the fit of the base model and a VAR(1) with error 
error corrections reproducing long run constraints of the DSGE model. RMSE’s 
are reported for 1-step and 4-step ahead predictions. 
 
 
 DSGE 
1-step 
VAR(1) 
1-step 
DSGE 
4-step 
VAR(1) 
4-step 
  Ytg 0.005581 0.003838 0.005459 0.00482 
  Ctg 0.005357 0.00349 0.00501 0.004114 
  Itg 0.015205 0.010913 0.014945 0.013367 
  Gtg 0.00462 0.0037 0.00443 0.004028 
   IGtg 0.005466 0.003365 0.011552 0.00761 
  TRtg 0.005454 0.002583 0.005077 0.00341 
  Ltg 0.001489 0.001214 0.002099 0.001488 
  Wtπ 0.007895 0.004743 0.007112 0.00552 
  tinom 0.001156 0.00086 0.002804 0.00162 
 tπ  0.003208 0.002401 0.003706 0.00290 
  Mtπ 0.012617 0.009285 0.014677 0.01213 
  Xtπ 0.006065 0.004675 0.00728 0.00582 
  Etg 0.02927 0.020961 0.027276 0.024352 
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2.4 Variance decompositions 
 
In Tables 2.4-6 we report the posterior intervals of the variance decomposition for 
conditional variance (1-step and 4-step ahead) and unconditional variance. The short 
run variation of GDP growth is mainly driven by shocks to productivity, the private 
demand components, in particular investment, and trade. Monetary and fiscal policy 
shocks play a relatively small role and explain a portion in the range of 5-13% of the 
short term variation. Price and wage mark up shocks play an even smaller role. The 
long run decomposition of GDP growth does not change strongly, except for a slightly 
larger role of the wage mark up shock and productivity and a smaller contribution of 
investment. Notice, these results are difficult to compare with variance 
decompositions from other models, since we are looking at GDP growth, instead of 
GDP levels. Inflation in the short run is mainly driven by shocks to the price mark up, 
while the long run variation is dominated by shocks to the wage mark up. Monetary 
policy shocks play a negligible role in the variation of inflation both in the short and 
the long run. This is in line with decomposition presented by Smets et al. (2007). The 
variance of the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate is largely driven by trade and 
risk premium shocks both in the short and the long run. There is a small role for both 
domestic and foreign monetary policy shocks. The short run variation in the nominal 
consumption share is driven by various shocks (trade, investment, own consumption 
shock, as well as risk premium and productivity shocks) while the productivity shock 
plays a more dominant role for the 4-step ahead conditional variance. The investment 
share is mainly driven by its own shock and the productivity shock. Unconditional 
variances of the nominal shares are dominated by the productivity shock. The trade 
balance ratio is mainly driven by trade and risk premium shocks, while the wage 
mark-up shock plays an important role in explaining the variance in employment and 
the wage share.  
 
 
TABLE 2.4. Posterior variance decomposition – 90% Highest Probability Interval. (Conditional 1-step ahead) 
 
Wage 
mark-up       
Price 
mark-up       
Monetary 
policy        
Fiscal 
policy         Investment   Consumption    Trade          
Risk 
premium      TFP             
Labour 
demand       
Rest of 
the world     
Foreign 
monetary 
shock 
Y
tg  0 0.966 4.65 1.252 14.105 2.182 13.875 3.721 20.603 0.001 0.223 2.521 
 1.345 2.747 10.312 2.378 24.577 10.482 26.632 11.599 36.855 0.233 0.53 6.629 
tinom  0.432 5.278 45.603 0.133 1.707 1.368 1.55 3.804 3.075 0.005 0.133 1.429 
 4.643 15.732 67.876 0.561 6.979 5.491 5.296 10.274 13.218 0.239 0.403 4.389 
tπ  3.827 48.599 0.975 0.06 1.53 2.787 0.284 1.109 1.913 0.082 0.111 0.403 
 20.677 77.162 4.308 0.336 6.744 10.506 1.867 5.08 9.662 0.95 0.518 1.918 
C
tπ  3.571 34.17 1.705 0.012 0.743 0.799 8.67 6.224 0.61 0.063 0.132 2.096 
 17.576 57.625 5.513 0.189 4.335 6.33 25.783 14.829 6.434 0.897 0.543 5.489 
M
tπ  0 0.18 0.896 0 0 0 68.748 9.255 0.097 0.005 0.063 2.719 
 1.222 0.535 2.379 0.031 0.103 0.702 84.23 20.14 0.545 0.135 0.25 6.744 
X
tπ  1.024 0.124 0.102 0.003 0.15 0.308 88.844 0.14 0.054 0.022 0.016 0.044 
 5.543 1.547 0.556 0.04 0.979 1.96 96.214 0.779 1.033 0.256 0.084 0.241 
E
tg  0 0 2.142 0.017 0 0.271 38.587 25.247 0.646 0.001 0.212 8.917 
 0.681 0.092 4.598 0.119 0.763 2.874 57.276 39.882 2.191 0.128 0.72 15.245 
csn 0 0.043 0.134 1.826 14.968 12.76 18.079 6.294 7.847 0.051 0.179 1.959 
 2.364 0.654 1.597 3.226 25.775 25.666 33.383 17.875 17.976 0.582 0.446 5.607 
gsn 0 0.033 1.931 23.496 9.225 2.113 20.566 0.232 6.079 0.001 0.137 0.477 
 0.793 0.832 5.88 35.953 17.869 8.912 36.984 4.273 19.64 0.149 0.342 2.705 
isn 0 0 0 0.29 75.713 1.411 1.213 2.05 5.013 0.016 0.081 0.845 
 0.853 0.241 0.717 0.587 85.002 4.607 3.265 5.842 9.602 0.146 0.226 2.076 
igsn 0 0.27 1.109 38.167 4.016 0.425 4.246 1.032 22.631 0 0.063 0.561 
 0.449 0.937 3.706 51.212 9.138 3.681 10.138 4.276 40.491 0.072 0.196 2.221 
tbyn 0 0 0.901 0.085 0.642 1.116 44.177 16.036 0.083 0.001 0.652 5.613 
 0.338 0.347 2.886 0.223 2.229 3.725 73.333 36.526 0.532 0.078 1.152 12.684 
L 21.579 0.067 1.515 0.366 6.236 0 1.953 3.985 12.121 5.28 0.309 1.659 
 45.533 0.843 6.329 0.904 15.011 5.694 5.603 9.852 25.13 25.225 0.742 3.808 
ws 48.197 4.998 0 0.564 1.021 0.183 6.136 0.009 1.51 1.23 0 0 
 64.433 12.606 0.606 1.265 7.076 9.329 14.21 4.991 7.356 10.785 0.05 1.738 
trw 3.097 0.008 0.202 74.653 0.847 0 0.29 0.425 1.538 0.685 0.048 0.188 
 9.492 0.156 1.148 88.97 3.021 1.053 1.147 2.085 5.138 4.753 0.158 0.754 
csnk 45.779 2.634 0 7.135 3.206 0 7.538 1.047 0.621 0.306 0 0.278 
 61.687 7.757 1.456 12.663 10.26 4.994 16.051 7.389 3.391 4.61 0.116 2.633 
csni 3.395 0 0.042 1.486 12.13 11.791 14.82 5.237 8.476 0 0.192 1.369 
 16.511 0.1 1.283 2.729 22.015 27.941 29.276 14.843 18.869 0.181 0.46 4.343 
TABLE 2.5. Posterior variance decomposition – 90% Highest Probability Interval. (Conditional 4-step ahead) 
 
Wage 
mark-up      
Price 
mark-up      
Monetary 
policy        
Fiscal 
policy         Investment   Consumption    Trade          
Risk 
premium     TFP             
Labour 
demand      
Rest of 
the world     
Foreign 
monetary 
shock 
Y
tg  0.573 0.791 3.989 1.233 11.317 1.969 16.297 4.078 24.331 0.059 0.313 2.249 
 3.456 2.297 8.86 2.439 20.285 9.452 28.698 10.332 41.259 0.419 0.664 5.14 
tinom  2.299 2.085 11.408 0.322 5.87 8.309 2.789 10.828 2.895 0.031 0.669 3.673 
 18.312 9.625 26.407 0.787 15.265 20.109 10.1 21.801 12.391 0.728 1.587 8.304 
tπ  12.938 19.846 1.823 0.052 2.119 6.043 0.697 2.039 1.909 0.219 0.234 0.608 
 43.949 45.58 6.288 0.457 10.044 19.083 3.278 7.909 11.466 2.039 0.94 2.783 
C
tπ  10.347 15.697 2.096 0.029 1.754 3.821 5.893 6.232 0.841 0.181 0.226 1.829 
 37.18 34.37 6.671 0.337 8.174 14.525 20.164 14.819 8.903 1.82 0.93 4.991 
M
tπ  0.418 0.212 0.837 0.003 0.064 0.174 68.001 9.48 0.117 0.018 0.194 2.457 
 3.095 0.724 2.309 0.032 0.391 0.873 83.211 19.887 0.733 0.247 0.479 6.31 
X
tπ  3.09 0.222 0.244 0.006 0.284 0.805 76.307 0.312 0.109 0.057 0.031 0.087 
 13.409 1.921 1.201 0.089 2.107 4.647 91.057 1.691 2.204 0.629 0.174 0.48 
E
tg  0.013 0.018 2.244 0.02 0.039 0.342 37.883 24.073 0.656 0.002 0.276 9.046 
 0.724 0.168 4.703 0.12 0.835 2.908 56.28 38.621 2.181 0.13 0.788 15.385 
csn 0.003 0.011 0.088 0.865 12.445 19.81 6.602 8.716 14.58 0.052 0.412 2.173 
 2.984 0.211 0.817 1.843 24.593 37.484 13.859 19.559 28.388 0.795 0.961 4.491 
gsn 0.092 0.273 1.734 17.113 7.506 2.047 11.323 0.325 21.707 0.012 0.283 0.49 
 3.5 1.123 5.232 30.961 16.112 11.066 24.777 3.065 39.201 0.421 0.687 1.766 
isn 0.001 0 0.001 0.176 66.502 2.281 0.771 2.449 6.737 0.021 0.203 0.962 
 1.162 0.183 0.273 0.477 80.88 8.617 2.03 7.513 15.264 0.224 0.509 2.293 
igsn 0.025 0.038 0.152 78.792 0.497 0.034 0.294 0.189 6.678 0.001 0.018 0.067 
 0.517 0.224 0.856 90.025 2.073 0.981 0.909 0.923 15.324 0.043 0.093 0.412 
tbyn 0.01 0.003 0.93 0.126 1.105 3.608 23.475 30.158 0.265 0.003 2.229 9.295 
 0.837 0.119 2.472 0.37 4.228 9.317 40.287 50.312 0.773 0.093 3.213 13.586 
L 38.021 0.128 1.087 0.281 5.169 0.001 1.606 3.627 7.943 2.374 0.349 1.349 
 66.582 0.941 5.311 0.787 14.072 5.574 4.387 9.24 19.422 9.483 0.845 3.188 
ws 63.646 1.407 0.125 0.099 0.228 3.877 0.846 0.118 0.806 1.757 0.004 0.042 
 83.758 4.429 1.143 0.29 1.783 15.08 2.346 2.051 3.788 12.747 0.061 0.466 
trw 18.638 0.057 0.534 30.644 2.706 0.001 0.763 1.95 4.302 1.148 0.203 0.681 
 40.738 0.53 2.966 57.057 8.248 3.122 2.471 5.831 11.843 5.504 0.545 1.863 
csnk 72.439 0.548 0.047 1.848 0.779 0.634 1.067 0.719 0.368 0.173 0.003 0.098 
 86.666 2.255 0.357 4.939 4.095 6.975 2.759 3.99 3.023 4.799 0.135 0.993 
csni 6.455 0 0.067 0.731 10.318 14.873 4.802 7.466 13.487 0.001 0.378 1.623 
 25.02 0.082 0.768 1.554 21.369 32.976 11.461 16.996 25.968 0.18 0.87 3.661 
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TABLE 2.6. Posterior variance decomposition – 90% Highest Probability Interval. (Unconditional variance) 
 
Wage 
mark-up      
Price 
mark-up      
Monetary 
policy        
Fiscal 
policy         Investment   Consumption    Trade          
Risk 
premium      TFP             
Labour 
demand       
Rest of 
the world     
Foreign 
monetary 
shock 
Y
tg  1.959 0.811 4.017 1.215 10.692 2.284 15.606 4.097 24.094 0.075 0.375 2.693 
 5.595 2.347 8.745 2.37 19.044 10.292 27.371 10.282 40.416 0.528 0.745 5.542 
tinom  12.237 0.339 1.545 0.236 4.011 9.181 2.477 7.865 5.35 0.087 0.355 1.331 
 41.207 1.514 3.808 0.948 20.184 34.775 6.814 18.296 17.481 1.318 1.155 4.039 
tπ  25.437 9.128 1.08 0.066 1.531 3.697 0.718 2.321 2.593 0.336 0.129 0.349 
 60.978 22.619 4.379 0.355 11.451 19.403 3.236 7.696 16.839 3.644 0.586 1.665 
C
tπ  23.333 7.158 1.042 0.053 1.411 3.423 3.156 4.054 2.109 0.312 0.112 0.834 
 57.303 17.748 4.454 0.314 11.078 18.272 10.584 10.799 15.644 3.459 0.562 2.783 
M
tπ  3.152 0.204 0.809 0.021 0.365 0.951 58.345 7.859 0.438 0.051 0.211 2.272 
 12.386 0.655 2.136 0.093 2.826 4.418 75.868 17.296 3.193 0.732 0.46 5.673 
X
tπ  7.938 0.173 0.337 0.018 0.565 1.125 52.166 0.856 0.737 0.155 0.049 0.126 
 29.026 1.318 1.503 0.125 5.322 8.741 75.642 3.326 7.432 1.812 0.213 0.56 
E
tg  0.527 0.023 2.136 0.033 0.268 0.946 36.767 23.047 0.937 0.007 0.5 9.345 
 2.86 0.191 4.478 0.145 1.645 3.847 54.777 37.199 2.561 0.212 1.005 15.48 
csn 0.41 0.006 0.014 0.085 3.814 1.726 0.641 1.236 60.317 0.087 0.031 0.138 
 8.179 0.031 0.107 0.491 20.661 10.162 2.647 6.681 83.618 0.706 0.217 0.768 
gsn 3.878 0.142 0.762 12.681 4.431 1.603 5.727 0.257 32.794 0.152 0.129 0.239 
 16.231 0.616 2.784 26.87 11.245 7.434 15.604 1.571 53.367 1.415 0.411 0.923 
isn 0.423 0.002 0.007 0.028 7.682 0.237 0.102 0.134 56.755 0.054 0.011 0.049 
 8.799 0.029 0.076 0.346 30.473 5.829 0.788 2.342 84.711 0.585 0.103 0.368 
igsn 0.036 0.004 0.016 90.311 0.089 0.009 0.034 0.02 1.151 0.001 0.002 0.011 
 0.898 0.052 0.201 98.44 0.623 0.304 0.267 0.23 7.327 0.055 0.027 0.115 
tbyn 0.709 0.002 0.413 0.102 0.786 3.452 18.037 35.407 0.277 0.001 1.944 6.04 
 5.843 0.065 1.234 0.508 4.834 13.513 32.705 60.979 1.019 0.083 2.942 9.509 
L 41.385 0.01 0.013 0.013 0.487 0.01 0.069 0.206 6.033 2.066 0.009 0.028 
 87.536 0.101 0.431 0.119 7.752 0.685 0.52 1.601 37.96 14.695 0.076 0.228 
ws 17.045 0.214 0.133 0.018 0.12 1.567 0.201 0.128 0.223 23.587 0.011 0.051 
 63.013 1.058 0.923 0.076 0.656 6.893 0.638 0.712 1.053 72.265 0.083 0.256 
trw 39.387 0.01 0.013 0.2 0.48 0.021 0.068 0.19 5.986 1.627 0.007 0.027 
 86.046 0.099 0.419 3.75 7.622 0.664 0.514 1.521 36.937 14.032 0.072 0.22 
csnk 59.105 0.084 0.072 0.312 0.217 0.591 0.171 0.118 3.104 3.975 0.004 0.022 
 85.889 0.446 0.456 1.375 2.609 3.019 0.539 0.911 12.521 25.205 0.033 0.16 
csni 2.467 0.007 0.029 0.084 3.758 1.575 0.553 0.91 52.13 0.071 0.032 0.105 
 23.495 0.048 0.179 0.425 19.421 8.743 2.283 5.982 80.318 1.42 0.195 0.632 
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3. Impulse Response Analysis  
 
We now proceed to investigate the effects of various structural shocks on the euro 
area economy. We use the estimated DSGE model to analyse the impulse responses of 
the main economic variables to structural shocks and the uncertainty surrounding 
these effects. The magnitude of the shocks is given by the posterior estimate of one 
standard deviation of the shock, i.e. we used the full joint posterior distribution of 
structural parameters and shocks to produce the Bayesian uncertainty bounds of the 
IRFs. 
 
Figures 2 to 4 show the response for the estimated model to a government 
consumption, investment and transfers shock respectively. The government 
consumption and investment shocks raise government spending as a share of output, 
but spending gradually returns to baseline. An increase in government consumption 
raises GDP temporarily, however it crowds out the interest sensitive demand 
components such as private investment and consumption of Ricardian households, 
while consumption of liquidity constrained households rises because of higher wage 
income. However, in the medium run liquidity constrained consumers also cut back 
consumption spending because of an increase in lump sum taxes, needed to finance 
the government spending shock. Notice, however, the aggregate consumption 
multiplier of government consumption is negative. This result seems at first sight in 
conflict with the findings of Gali et al. (2007). They show that allowing for a fraction 
of credit constrained consumers exceeding 25%, a model with sticky prices can 
account for a positive consumption response to a government spending shock. 
However, their model assumes no nominal wage rigidities and no labour adjustment 
costs (in our notation γw  = γL = 0). In contrast our estimation results show that 
especially the labour adjustment cost parameter Lγ  is significantly different from 
zero. A sensitivity analysis (see annex) shows that when these parameters tend to zero 
(as assumed in Gali et al (2007)), the consumption response to a government spending 
shocks tends to become positive in our model too. The economic interpretation of this 
result is simple. Negligible wage and labour adjustment costs imply a stronger 
positive short run impact of an increase in government consumption on labour income 
and therefore a stronger response of private consumption.  
 
Our results can also be compared to Coenen and Straub (2005). They estimate a 
DSGE model for the euro area similar to Smets and Wouters (2003), but introduce 
non-Ricardian households in the model similar to our liquidity constrained 
consumers. For a lower share of non-Ricardian households (between 0.25 and 0.37) 
they find a short-lived rise in liquidity- constrained consumption, but falling below its 
steady state level already after a few quarters, caused by a rise in lump-sum taxes due 
to the build up of government debt. Forni et al. (2006) find a positive response of 
consumption to both a government purchases and a government employment shock, 
but assume no fiscal response to cyclical conditions and no labour adjustment costs 
 
To assess the impact of the government spending shocks on output in terms of 
traditional "multipliers", the impact effect for a 1 percent of government spending 
shock on GDP is 0.73 in the first quarter, falling to 0.45 in the fourth. It remains 
positive for seven to eight  years, and then turns negative. Cumulated over the first 
year the multiplier is 0.56. This is somewhat smaller than results reported in Roeger 
and in ’t Veld (2004) for the QUEST II model, which shows multipliers for the largest 
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four European countries between 0.85 and 0.956. The estimated impact fiscal 
multiplier is within the range found in empirical studies of fiscal policy using 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
applied SVAR methodology to study the effects of fiscal policy in the US and various 
authors have extended the SVAR methodology to include other countries. Perotti 
(2005) finds large differences in the effects of fiscal policy, with the responses of 
GDP and consumption having become weaker over time. Only for the US is the 
consumption response found positive and did the GDP multiplier exceed 1 in the post 
1980 period.  
 
The effect of government investment on GDP is more favourable (see figure 3), 
because government investment has a positive supply effect. Because of this the effect 
is also less inflationary and therefore requires a smaller interest rate response of the 
central bank. However one should notice that the government investment multiplier 
hinges importantly on the output elasticity of public capital which is not estimated. 
The parameter is calibrated such as to obtain a marginal product of public capital 
equal to the marginal product of private capital in the steady state. 
 
Figure 4 shows the responses to a government transfer shock. The increase in 
transfers raises disposable incomes and boosts liquidity-constrained consumption Ck 
directly. There is a negative impact on consumption of non liquidity-constrained 
consumers, but this is much smaller and aggregate consumption is positively affected 
by the transfer shock. Again, fiscal policy crowds out private investment. 
 
Figure 5 presents the level comparison of the estimated effect of an orthogonalised 
shock to nominal interest rates ( ). The shock leads to a rise in the (annualised) 
nominal short-term interest rate of 0.4 percentage points on impact. The real short-
term interest rate increases by more. The monetary policy shock is not very persistent 
and nominal interest rates return quickly to base. The shock leads to a hump-shaped 
fall in output. The maximum effect on investment is about three times as large as that 
on consumption and the peak effects occur after about two quarters. Inflation also 
peaks in the second quarter
INOM
tε
7 but we do not see the hump-shaped response in consumer 
price inflation that is a persuasive feature of many estimated VARs. This could be due 
to our small open economy assumption where we do not allow the Euro exchange rate 
to affect export prices of the rest of the world. This implies that the appreciation of the 
Euro is immediately passed on to domestic consumer prices. In a more realistic multi 
country setting the inflation response would likely be more delayed. Real wages fall 
in response to the monetary policy shock and employment is also negatively affected. 
Fiscal spending falls but the decline is less than that of GDP as fiscal policy acts 
counter-cyclically and partly offsets to effects of the monetary contraction. 
                                                 
6 There the government consumption shock is a weighted average of government purchases and wage 
expenditures. Wage expenditure shocks have larger effects on GDP than government purchases shocks. 
7 Lack of inflation inertia and inflation persistence has been a feature of many DSGE models. Cogley 
and Sbordone (2005) show that allowing for a shifting trend in the inflation target can improve the 
empirical description of the inflation process.  
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FIGURE 2.   Response to a government consumption shock. 
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FIGURE 3.   Response to a government investment shock.  
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FIGURE 4.   Response to a government transfers shock. 
Yt Ct It
0 20 40
-2
0
2
4
x 10
-4
0 20 40
-5
0
5
10
x 10
-4
1
x 10
-4
0
-1
-2
-3
0 20 40
TBYNtCit C
k
t
0 20 40
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-4
0 20 40
-2
0
2
4
x 10
-3
5
x 10
-5
0
-5
-10
0 20 40
Gt GIt TRt
0 20 40
-2
0
2
4
x 10
-4
0 20 40
-2
0
2
4
x 10
-4
10
x 10
-3
5
0
-5
0 20 40
 
0 20 40
-5
0
5
10
x 10-5
Lt
0 20 40
-2
0
2
4
x 10-4
WRt
0 20 40
-5
0
5
10
15
x 10-4
deficitt
0 20 40
-2
0
2
4
x 10-4
log(YGAPt)
0 20 40
-5
0
5
10
x 10-5
πt
0 20 40
-5
0
5
10
x 10-5 π
c
t
0 20 40
0
2
4
6
x 10-5
inomt
0 20 40
-5
0
5
x 10-5
Rt
0 20 40
-5
0
5
10
x 10-4
et
 
 31
FIGURE 5. Response to a monetary shock
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FIGURE 6.   Response to a shock to world demand. 
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FIGURE 7.   Response to a shock to TFP.  
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Our last example of a demand shock is a shock to foreign demand. Figure 6 presents 
the level comparison of the estimated effect of an orthogonalised shock to world 
output ( ). Because of nominal rigidities an increase in world demand leads first to 
an increase in capacity utilisation and employment. The initial excess demand is only 
gradually reduced by an increase in domestic prices. In the long run there is a positive 
output effect resulting from the terms of trade effect induced by a permanent shift in 
world demand for domestic goods. Government expenditure increases in line with 
nominal GDP (government purchases and investment) and the wage sum (government 
transfers), but they increase by less than would be the case if there was no active 
fiscal policy as the output and employment gap are positive. Thus fiscal policy limits 
the increase in aggregate demand and stabilises output. The overall effect of fiscal 
stabilisation is to reduce the initial increase in employment. Automatic stabilisation 
via transfers also smoothes consumption of liquidity-constrained households C
YF
tε
k .  
 
Figure 7 presents the level comparison of the estimated effect of an orthogonalised 
shock to TFP ( ). Because TFP follows a random walk, the productivity shock 
results in a permanent increase of output, consumption and investment. The real wage 
also rises, but there is a rather persistent negative employment effect. It is well known 
(see Gali, 1999) that with nominal rigidities supply shocks lead to a demand 
externality. Because firms lower prices insufficiently as a response to a cost-reducing 
shock, there is a lack of aggregate demand which makes it optimal for individual 
firms to lower employment. Expansionary government consumption partially 
compensates for the shortfall in demand. The automatic stabilisation via government 
transfers work in the same direction, since they respond to the decline in employment 
and boost consumption of liquidity constrained households.  
Y
tε
 
 
 
4  Medium term trends: the case of a declining wage share 
 
A continuously declining wage share over the sample period is an important stylised 
fact for the European economy. In our empirical analysis we allow for two 
mechanisms which allow the model to match this fact, namely a declining share of 
overhead labour and a secular increase in the mark up of prices over marginal cost. 
Unfortunately both shocks are not directly observable; however, they can be identified 
by using the model because they affect first order conditions differently. The 
overhead labour shock only affects the labour demand equation while the mark up 
shock affects labour demand and investment in a similar fashion. Both explanations 
have some empirical validity. It is likely that structural reforms in the goods market 
and in particular large scale privatisations which occurred in various euro area 
member states over the sample period may have lead to a decline in overhead labour. 
It is also likely that the economy-wide mark up has increased over the sample period 
due to an increasing share of services in total output. As documented in many 
sectorial studies on mark ups (see for example Oliveira Martins et al., 1997) the 
service sector tends to have higher mark ups (the absence of both shocks in the US 
case is also consistent with a relatively stable US wage share). In the following we use 
the model in a counterfactual analysis in order to first determine the relative 
importance of the two explanations in accounting for the evolution of the wage share 
and second for explaining the economic consequences of these trends. 
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As can be seen from Figures 8 and 9, our estimates indicate that the share of overhead 
labour in total employment LOL has fallen by about 20% points and mark ups have 
increased by about 5% points. As shown in figure 10, the decline in overhead labour 
explains about 50% of the decline in the wage share. Both effects explain a large 
fraction of the decline (60-70%). 
 
The reduction in overhead labour increases productivity without increasing the 
marginal product of production workers (marginal productivity of labour actually 
falls), this leads to a decline in the wage share. Because firms can supply the same 
output with less labour and the marginal product of labour has declined, the reduction 
in overhead labour does not by itself lead to an increase in factor demand. In fact it 
reduces the demand for labour since the reduction of fixed costs reduces the marginal 
product of labour. Therefore there is a new equilibrium with less labour input, lower 
GDP, lower real wages but higher average productivity. 
 
The increase in the price mark up affects the measured mark up directly and leads to a 
reduction of both factor inputs. In contrast to a reduction in overhead labour the mark 
up shock reduces labour and capital inputs simultaneously. 
 
Finally, we can ask the question whether both shocks acted independently or whether 
there is a correlation between them. Theoretically it is plausible that a reduction in 
overhead labour could have removed entry barriers and thus have led to a reduction in 
mark ups, suggesting a positive correlation, i.e. corr(lol,eta) > 0. Alternatively it is 
also possible that an increase in the mark up could have increased overhead labour via 
some rent sharing agreements between workers and firms, implying a negative 
correlation, i.e. corr(lol,eta) < 0 , and therefore restrict the decline in LOL. A small 
negative correlation (corr(lol,eta) = -0.22) can be observed in the reconstruction of 
the historical shocks (smoothed shocks). 
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FIGURE 8. Counterfactual experiment: solid lines are for the case when the level of 
LOL remains fixed at the values of begin of 80’s; dashed lines show the actual data. 
Yt Ct It
0.4
1960 1980 2000 2020
0
0.2
0.4
1960 1980 2000 2020
0
0.2
0.4
1960 1980 2000 2020
-0.2
0
0.2
Lt TBt/Yt WSt
0.1 0.04 0.8
1960 1980 2000 2020
-0.1
0
1960 1980 2000 2020
-0.02
0
0.02
1960 1980 2000 2020
0.4
0.6
E_LOLWt/Pt RERt 0.4
1960 1980 2000 2020
0
0.2
0.4
1960 1980 2000 2020
-0.5
0
0.5
1960 1980 2000 2020
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
 
 37
FIGURE 9. Counterfactual experiment: solid lines are for the case when the level of 
mark-up shocks remains fixed at the values of begin of 80’s; dashed lines show the 
actual data. 
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FIGURE 10. Counterfactual experiment:  
upper plots show the actual wage share, the decline of the actual wage share which is 
explained by the decrease in labour overhead and in price mark-up. The bottom plot 
compares the actual wage share data with the two counterfactual experiments. 
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5  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have described the estimation of an open economy DSGE model for 
the euro area. So far most estimated DSGE models have mainly been concerned with 
monetary policy analysis. We have extended the model by incorporating fiscal 
reaction functions that allow the model to be used for fiscal policy analysis. Fiscal 
policy is effective in the model as we allow for financial market rigidities that force 
some households to consume their current wage and transfer income. Our paper 
differs also from other estimated DSGE models in that it treats the euro area as an 
open economy and is not estimated using detrended data, which allows us to analyse 
the effects of non stationary productivity shocks. 
 
In future research we intent to extend this analysis in various directions. It would be 
interesting to explore how the stabilising properties of the estimated rules compare to 
simple optimal rules. We have also disregarded automatic stabilisation from other 
revenue components. This requires a more careful analysis of various tax rules. In 
future research, more attention will also have to be devoted to fiscal stabilisation at 
the level of euro area member states.      
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 bis: fit of a VAR(1) including VECM corrections matching those 
implied by the  DSGE model. 
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ANNEX 1 The steady state 
 
 
The DSGE model implies a number of long run restrictions for growth rates, nominal 
shares and price ratios. The determination of the steady state of the model is described 
below, where steady state is denoted by the endogenous names without the index t. 
 
Long run growth rates and inflations are calibrated as follows: 
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The steady state of real per capita GDP growth rate determines all the real growth 
rates of the model, except for investment, which is given by: 
UIYI ggg += . 
 
The steady state of GDP deflator inflation defines the steady state of all inflation rates 
in the model and also of nominal wage inflation, as: 
YW g+= ππ  
 
The technology growth is determined by: 
UI
G
Y
G
UP  g
α
-α(-gg )21 αα
αα −−+=  
 
Nominal interest rate is given by: 
1/1 −+= βπi  
 
The model allows for a generalised case, where the rate of time preference in the 
domestic and foreign countries is different, implying different steady state nominal 
interest rates. The net foreign asset share to GDP is thus given by: 
 
riskiibyn
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BE FF
t
F
/)( −==  
 
This implies a steady state level for the nominal trade balance share: 
FPOPY bynggitbyn )( +++−= π  
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By combining the GDP equilibrium condition and equations (21-24), the identity 
 can be expressed only in terms of trade balance, real exchange 
rate and foreign to domestic GDP ratio, ywy. The latter ratio is calibrated at 1, 
allowing to obtain ER from tbyn. From this all the price ratios can be determined as: 
tbynimynexyn =− )(
( )
1/
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where  is the share of intra trade, calibrated at 0.5. The import and export shares 
are also determined as: 
Xα
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In the case when the domestic rate of time preference is equal to the one of the rest of 
the world, the above listed steady state conditions simplify to: 
0== tbynbynF  
1)/()/()/( ==== YXYMYC PPPPPPER  
WMM ssexynimyn ,=== . 
 
From the closure of the trade balance equations, the steady state of the domestic 
variables can be finally solved. First, from capital accumulation, we get: 
δ=ik  
GGik δ=  
and, from capital FOC, we also get: 
)1/1/()1)(1)(1( δβατ ++−−−−= rptkyn K  
This defines the nominal investment share: 
kynikiyn ⋅=  
The government shares are calibrated to match observed ratios: 
025.0
203.0
=
=
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The consumption share is thus given by: 
)(1 tbynigyncgyniyncyn +++−=  
 
The wage share is simply given by: 
ατ )1( −=ws  
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Calibrated constants are: 
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where α  is set to match the nominal wage share at the end of the sample, while β  is 
set to match the very small difference in the levels of interest rate and inflation in the 
end of sample. 
 
The steady state of employment rate is set at 0.65. This implies a restriction for ω , 
which is a function of the steady  state of employment rate and of other model 
parameters. 
The steady state of ucap is set at 1, implying 
kynucap /)1)(1(1, ατγ −−=  
 
The steady state of the GDP share of government debt byn is set at 2.4 (60% yearly), 
while the level of nominal transfer share is estimated, implying the steady state of 
lump sum tax: 
cyntwstwssscttrwcgynigynbynggitaxyn CPWPOPY ⋅−−−+−+++−−−= )1()()( π
 where 
2.0==== KCW tttssc  
 
This allows to determine the steady state of the share of liquidity constrained 
consumers 
)1/(])1[( CWk ttaxyntrwwsssctcyn +−+−−=  
and hence the non-liquidity constrained ones are: 
)1/()( slccynslccyncyn kj −⋅−= . 
 45
ANNEX 2 Mapping acceptability of the prior domain. 
 
 
The prior assumptions used for the Bayesian estimation have been preliminary 
checked, to assess the acceptability domain of the model within the prior space, i.e. to 
detect the occurrence of unstable behaviour of indeterminacy. This is performed 
following the Monte Carlo Filtering approach shown in Ratto (2008). We generated a 
Monte Carlo sample of model parameters from prior distributions and for each 
element of the sample we have checked the rank condition for the eigenvalues of the 
linearised model. This analysis showed that 94.4% of the prior domain is acceptable, 
5.1% of the prior domain provides explosive solutions while only a 0.4% gives 
indeterminacy. The large portion of the acceptability domain allows us to state that 
our prior space is well defined and subsequent posterior update is not affected by 
large portion of violations of Blanchard Kahn conditions. 
 
Concerning the explosive behaviour, sensitivity analysis showed that this is mostly 
driven by  
• too small values of sfp, sfpx and sfw; 
• too small values for ; INOMπτ
• too large values of ; Xσ
• large negative values of . CGLagτ
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ANNEX 3 Sensitivity analysis of consumption response to government spending 
shock 
 
In this annex we discuss the sensitivity analysis of the consumption response to 
government spending shock. In particular we are interested in the detailed mapping of 
the model parameterisations that drive towards a positive or a negative response in the 
short term. 
We apply the same Monte Carlo sample used for the acceptability analysis shown in 
ANNEX 2 and solve the model for each MC realisation. This allows to obtain the 
prior uncertainty distribution of the first quarter response of versus , that we 
report in Figure A1.1. In Figure A1.1 it can be seen that under the prior assumptions 
implied by the model structure and prior distributions, the model puts a somewhat 
larger prior probability for a negative response (the mode of the histogram is on the 
negative part). Nonetheless, the prior probability of a positive response is also 
significantly larger than zero. This is the result of the combination of the prior 
distribution for liquidity constrained households, which is evenly and neutrally 
distributed between negative and positive responses, and the prior distribution for 
Ricardian households, which is always negative. 
tcΔ CGu
 
In order to understand more clearly the conditions under which a positive response is 
more likely than a negative one, we perform a detailed sensitivity analysis. In 
particular we apply global sensitivity analysis techniques to map the function 
 
)()u  vs.( CG XfcY t =Δ=  
 
 
where X is the vector of model  parameters. The details about the estimation method 
can be found in Ratto et al. (2007) and Ratto (2008). The approach we adopt is in 
practice the estimation of a non-parametric regression model on the MC sample used 
for Figure A1: 
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where  is the mean of Y, e is the residual of the non parametric regression 
model and 
)(0 YEf =
0)|()( fXYEXf iii −=  are the non-parametric regression terms for each  
model parameter, i.e. the conditional expectation of Y, given . The quantity 
 is the so-called correlation ratio or non-parametric R-squared and provides 
the portion of variance of Y that is explained by each model parameter . Hence, the 
 terms provide the best least-squares predictors of Y, based on univariate 
functions of single model parameters. This MC approach to sensitivity is typical in 
global sensitivity analysis (see e.g. Saltelli et al., 2004) and detects the effect of each 
model parameter by varying all the other parameters at the same time. This provides 
an extremely powerful measure of sensitivity, since a significant pattern in terms of 
conditional expectations  tells that changing the value of  implies a shift 
in the mean of Y, i.e. tells that one is able to drive the sign of Y whatever the values of 
the remaining model parameters. This contrasts with other sensitivity analysis 
iX
),cov( Yfi
iX
)( ii Xf
)|( iXYE iX
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typically found in the literature, which are performed moving one parameter at a time 
around a base point in the prior space. This latter approach may be heavily prone to 
the base point around which the analysis is performed. 
 
In Figure A2 we show the plots of  for the most important parameters driving 
the consumption response (continuous lines). Dotted lines show the width of the 90% 
confidence bands of the estimated non-parametric curves, that allow to appreciate the 
significance of the  functions. The values in the y –axis tell exactly by how 
much one can expect to change the value of the consumption response with respect to 
its prior mean values by varying each single parameter. These plots allow a rather 
interesting and informative discussion. 
)( ii Xf
)( ii Xf
 
1. most parameters display a rather non-linear pattern, with rather sharp negative 
or positive peaks towards the bounds of their prior distributions; 
2. labour and wage adjustment cost coefficients Lγ  display a decreasing pattern: 
when they tend to zero, the  patterns show a rather non-linear and 
peaked positive values while increasing adjustment costs tend to drive 
smoothly towards a negative consumption response; 
)( ii Xf
3. price adjustment cost coefficient Pγ  has an opposite behaviour and increasing 
Pγ  drives a positive consumption response, while Pγ  towards zero implies a 
sharp negative tendency for this response; 
4. large values of  and slc also drive a positive response of consumption; Cσ
5. the patterns for  and  suggest that the more persistent is G spending, 
the more negative will be  the consumption response; 
CG
Adjτ CGρ
6. the shape for monetary policy parameters suggests that the more the monetary 
authority is active, the smaller (i.e. more negative) will be the consumption 
response: in fact positive C response is associate to high  values and 
small ,  and  
INOM
lagτ
INOM
πτ INOMY 1,τ INOMY 2,τ
7. the transfer rule also affects the consumption response: the larger the response 
to unemployment, the more negative tends to be the consumption response. 
 
One would also expect an effect of Wγ . This is extremely non-linear and the simple 
smoothing technique on a single Monte Carlo sample does not allow to visualize the 
effect of Wγ . In Figure A1.2 we show the prior uncertainty distribution of the 
consumption response when Wγ  has been fixed at zero. Now the aggregate 
consumption is evenly distributed around zero, implying the probability of a positive 
response versus government spending is increased. This is due to the much more 
skewed distribution of liquidity constrained households towards positive values. 
Fixing contemporaneously 0== WL γγ  as in Gali et al (2007), we get that the prior 
distribution of the response of aggregate consumption versus government spending is 
almost entirely on positive values. 
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FIGURE A1.1 Prior uncertainty distribution of the response of aggregate 
consumption growth to government spending shock  
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FIGURE A1.2 Prior uncertainty distribution of the response of aggregate 
consumption growth to government spending shock when 0=Wγ . 
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FIGURE A1.3 Prior uncertainty distribution of the response of aggregate 
consumption growth to government spending shock when 0== WL γγ . 
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FIGURE A2. Sensitivity analysis of the response of aggregate consumption to 
government spending shock.
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ANNEX 4 
 
TABLE A1: Estimation Results for exogenous shocks 
 
Prior posterior Parameter name 
distrib mean std mean std 
kCσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0597 0.0107 
τσ   gamma 0.1 0.06 0.15 0.0246 
PMσ   gamma 0.02 0.015 0.0202 0.0038 
PXσ   gamma 0.1 0.06 0.0648 0.0355 
EXσ   gamma 0.005 0.03 0.0044 4.37E-04 
CGσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0048 3.46E-04 
IGσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0056 4.17E-04 
Leisσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0283 0.0078 
LOLσ   gamma 0.005 0.003 0.0048 0.001 
INOMσ   gamma 0.003 0.0015 0.0013 9.88E-05 
FBσ   gamma 0.005 0.003 0.0017 2.40E-04 
rpσ   gamma 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.0017 
TRσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0022 1.57E-04 
Wσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0437 0.0156 
UPσ   gamma 0.05 0.03 0.0121 0.0013 
Cρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.9144 0.0295 
ηρ   beta 0.5 0.2 0.1095 0.0771 
Mηρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.9557 0.0164 
Xηρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.8109 0.0668 
CGρ   beta 0.5 0.2 0.2983 0.1 
IGρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.853 0.0797 
Leisρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.975 0.0159 
Lssρ   beta 0.95 0.02 0.9334 0.0188 
UIρ   beta 0.5 0.2 0.6652 0.1409 
PWPXρ   beta 0.5 0.2 0.2159 0.0686 
FBρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.9842 0.0103 
rpρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.9148 0.0233 
ucapρ   beta 0.95 0.02 0.9517 0.0187 
TRρ   beta 0.85 0.075 0.8636 0.0428 
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Figure A3. Prior distributions (grey lines), posterior distributions (black lines) and 
posterior mode (dotted lines) of the estimated parameters. 
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